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INTRODUCTION 
Th~ briefs snbmi tted by Respondent (!:he "Board") and 
Intervenor cpr:»- present basically the same arguments 
:p -.;. . - .ion ddvanoed by tih»:j Sierra Club. T» 
organize anc simplify petitioner's reply to those arguments, 
petitioner w xx address these arquments uiniei I l"ifj fr| I. win f 
gene* -. :/^o nas • Standaid ot Review,, (li! Interpretation of 
Regulation; n\: :., Appropriate Remedy. 
ARGUMENT 1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: CORRECTNESS-OF-ERROR AND 
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ARE THE STANDARDS OF PETITIONER 
REVIEW THAT SHOULD BE APPLIED IN THE PRESENT CASE. 
,.. -^  
reasonableness standard ser r-.r* K r, the ' "ah :- .preme Ccur* m 
Morton International, Inc v Audit ino r;\ 0.1 <± r - ~9 
(I Jtai 1 1 99. \ > . \ . : ,^n, * f - :> v;ew.:.j ~curt_ is
 ta. . .we.; 
review an aoen -y s decision under a reasonableness standarc 1:1 
those instance- :r w;.: *• *;- ^ i*-:. • *-* 
11 iteo:- , ~ ;.<- .^  ; ne ro«ra reasons - nar nne statutory 
grant *:f authority r ' ~:.-- ~ :*: ; t estairl.^h criteria :c: citing 
commercial hazardous waste la - " • --- * - ^ . ~; . * grai it 
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of discretion to the Board to interpret its rules and 
regulations,1 
As a general rule, an agency's interpretation of its 
own regulation is entitled to judicial deference. See Concerned 
Parents of Stepchildren v. Mitchell , 645 P.2d 629, 633 (Utah 
1982). However, administrative regulations like the citing 
criteria at issue in the present case cannot be ignored or 
followed by the agency to suit its own purposes. State, Etc. v. 
Utah Merit System Counsel, 614 P.2d 1259, 1263 (Utah 1980). 
In Morton, the Utah Supreme Court announced the 
dispositive factor in determining the appropriate standard of 
review to be whether the agency, by virtue of its experience or 
expertise, was in a better position than the courts to give 
effect to the regulatory objective to be achieved. Morton 
International, Inc. v. Auditing Div., 814 P.2d at 586. 
As the Morton Court explained: 
We do not defer to the (agency) when construing statutory 
terms or when applying statutory terms to the facts unless 
the construction of the statutory language or the 
application of the law to the facts should be subject to the 
(agency's) expertise gleaned from its accumulated practical, 
first-hand experience with the subject matter. 
Id. at 586-87. 
USPCI appears to echo the argument presented by the Board 
on this issue. It argues that the statutory directive 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 19-6-105(3) to establish 
criteria carries with it an implied discretion relating 
to application of the criteria. 
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The specific regulatory language at issue in the 
present case states: 
The application shall also contain evidence that 
emergency response plans have been coordinated with local 
and regional response personnel. 
Utah Admin. R.315-3-23(c) (1) . 
The regulation in question does not contain technical 
terms for which the agency's expertise rather than the court's 
would apply. The language in question is no different than that 
employed in numerous statutes, contracts and other writings that 
courts deal with on a daily basis. Therefore, even under the 
Morton standard, this Court should apply the less differential 
correction-of-error standard. See also Savage Industries v. Utah 
State Tax Commission, 811 P.2d 664, 668 (Utah 1991). 
Once this Court determines the appropriate 
interpretation of the regulatory language it must then determine 
if substantial evidence exists to support the Board's ultimate 
conclusions. See First National Bank of Boston v. County Board 
of Equalization, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). 
ARGUMENT II 
INTERPRETATION OF REGULATION: EVIDENCE OF COORDINATION 
WITH NON-AFFILIATED LOCAL AS WELL AS REGIONAL EMERGENCY 
RESPONSE PERSONNEL IS REQUIRED UNDER THE APPLICABLE 
REGULATION. 
Because of the limited quantity and nature of the 
evidence presented to the Board on the issue of coordination of 
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emergency response plans, interpretation of R.315-3-23(c) (1) 
becomes the determinative issue in this appeal. The Board and 
USPCI argue that the mandate of R.315-3-23(c)(1) (that emergency 
response plans have been coordinated with local and regional 
response personnel) was fulfilled in this case in one of two 
ways.2 In the first instance, they argue that intracompany 
coordination between the three USCPI* business locations in Tooele 
County constituted adequate evidence of local coordination. 
Secondarily, they argue that, based on the distance between the 
site and the nearest municipality, local coordination was not 
necessary.3 
At page 21 of its brief, USPCI presents an argument that 
the Board did not rely on evidence of prospective 
agreements. Specifically, USPCI points to the testimony 
of Cheryl Heying to support its argument. Ms. Heying was 
questioned directly on the issue presently before this 
Court. She testified that the emergency response 
assessment found in the contingency plan attachment 
constituted evidence of compliance with R. 315-3-23 (c) (1) . 
Index Part B. Doc. 55 (March 17, 1992 Hearing Transcript 
at 514-515). 
The Board's and USPCI's argument that no coordination was 
required at the local level ignores the express 
provisions of R.315-3-23(d). Subparagraph (d) provides 
that exemptions from the criteria may be granted upon 
application after an appropriate public comment period. 
A request to dispense with the requirement of local 
coordination would fall squarely within the reach of that 
subparagraph. Any interpretation of R.315-3-23 must 
harmonize with rather than override that separate 
provision. 
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Sierra Club has conceded that adequate evidence was 
presented to the Board to support a finding that coordination 
with regional response personnel had been completed prior to 
August 14, 1990. That coordination was embodied in part in an 
agreement between USPCI and Tooele County entitled "USCPI-Tooele 
County Impact Mitigation Agreement (Index, Part B, Doc. 56, 
Attachment B)". This Agreement, which was entered into in 1988, 
provides for the coordination of the county's emergency response 
personnel. 
In addition, the Impact Mitigation Agreement provides 
that USPCI shall pay impact mitigation fees to Tooele County to 
compensate the county for the cost of deploying its emergency 
response personnel. 
There can be no question that the payment of impact 
mitigation fees is a critical component of the Impact Mitigation 
Agreement. The nature of the business engaged in by USPCI and 
others who build, operate and maintain hazardous waste facilities 
carries with it significant risk that the handling of the 
hazardous materials will result in emergency situations that 
threaten the safety and welfare of the populace. 
Equally important is the risk that an area's populace 
will be burdened with the extraordinary expense inherent in any 
response to this type of emergency situation. The arguments 
presented by the Board and USPCI are addressed exclusively to the 
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former concern, to wit, the safety and welfare of the people in 
Tooele County. 
The Board and USPCI argue that the portion of the 
application that states that personnel at the other USCPI 
locations will be trained and available to respond in emergency 
situations fulfills the requirement for coordination with local 
personnel. 
However, the existence of trained personnel, either at 
the specific site or at other locations operated by an applicant, 
does not address the adjacent municipalities' concerns about the 
financial burden created by their inevitable response to 
emergency situations caused by the operation of the facility. No 
one has argued, nor could they, that municipal response personnel 
will not be involved in the overall emergency response. In fact, 
USPCI recognizes response personnel from local communities will 
be involved when it states in its brief that emergency response 
coordination shall result in contacts with Tooele County, Tooele 
City, Grantsville City, the Utah Highway Patrol and appropriate 
medical services. (USPCI's Brief pp. 18-19). 
When viewed in its entirety, R.315-3-23 establishes 
specific criteria that must be met by an applicant in siting a 
hazardous waste facility. Subsection (b) of the rule prohibits 
the siting of such a facility in certain, specific locations. 
Subsection (b)(xiii) prohibits the location of a hazardous waste 
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facility within five miles of existing permanent dwellings, 
residential areas, etc. 
Subsection (c) of R.315-3-23 addresses emergency 
response and transportation questions. That subsection is 
divided into three parts. The first requires an assessment of 
the availability and adequacy of emergency response services. 
Such an assessment must be included in the plan approval 
application. Subsection (c)(1) also requires that the 
application contain evidence that emergency response plans have 
been coordinated with local and regional response personnel. 
Subsection (c)(2) of R.315-3-23 requires the applicant 
employ trained emergency response personnel that are capable of 
responding to emergencies at the site and along transportation 
routes within the state. Obviously, USPCI's personnel at the 
site and at USCPI-Grassy Mountain and USCPI-Lakepoint fulfill 
that requirement.4 
These requirements regarding the siting of a hazardous 
waste facility implicitly recognize that such a facility shall 
Subsection (c)(2) requires details of the proposed 
emergency response capacity be given in the plan approval 
application. The Board argues that the portions of the 
application that contain a description of this capacity 
also fulfill the requirements of subsection (c) (1) . 
(Respondent's Brief pp. 14-15) . Coordination with local 
emergency response personnel is a separate and distinct 
requirement of the regulation which cannot be merged with 
another distinct requirement, to wit, emergency response 
personnel maintained by the applicant. 
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impact cities and counties adjacent to any potential location. 
The Board's regulations present specific prohibitions against 
locating a facility in certain defined areas. In addition, the 
siting criteria require an assessment of non-affiliated emergency 
services relative to the proposed location and pre-application 
coordination with non-affiliated local and regional emergency 
response personnel. 
The criteria found in R.315-3-23(c)(1) represent a 
means by which municipalities and counties become participants in 
the site selection process.5 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized the broad powers 
granted to counties and cities to provide for the health and 
welfare of their citizens. See State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 
1116 (Utah 1980). As the majority opinion in Hutchinson stated: 
The grant of general welfare power to counties is duplicated 
by a similar grant to cities . . . 
Id. at 1122. 
Quoting a leading authority on municipal government the 
majority of the Court in Hutchinson explained: 
. . . courts uniformly regard the (welfare) clause as ample 
authority for a reasonable exercise, in good faith, of broad 
R.315-3-23 (c) expressly recognizes that Titles 10 and 17 
of the Utah Code Annotated gives cities and counties 
authority for local use planning and zoning and provides 
that cities and counties may establish additional 
requirements for the siting of hazardous waste 
facilities. 
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and various municipal activity to protect the health, 
morals, peace and good order of the community to promote its 
welfare in trade, commerce, industry and manufacturing, and 
to carry out every appropriate object contemplated in the 
creation of the municipal corporation. 
Id. at 1125. 
The requirement of pre-application coordination with 
non-affiliated local response personnel provides municipalities 
that will be impacted by the site selection an avenue for active 
participation in the siting process. As pre-application 
participants the municipalities can effect their broad purpose 
and protect their citizenry from the physical and financial 
burdens imposed by the risks inherent in applicant's business. 
All parties recognize that Tooele County was allowed to 
participate in this process and emerged from that participation 
with an agreement that provided direct monetary compensation from 
USPCI in the form of impact mitigation fees. Both the Board and 
USPCI ask this Court to interpret R.315-3-23(c)(1) by eliminating 
the necessity of similar coordination between the applicant and 
proximate municipalities.6 
Both the Board and USPCI argue the fact that Grantsville 
and Tooele are not next to the proposed site provides 
justification for the Board interpreting the term "local" 
out of R. 315-3-23 (c) (1) . Grantsville is located 
approximately 37 miles from the proposed location and 
Tooele is approximately 47 miles away. USCPI-Lakepoint 
which is presented by both parties as evidencing local 
coordination is located 50 miles from the site. 
Depending on the access route used for any particular 
shipment of hazardous waste, either Grantsville or Tooele 
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By eliminating the requirement of pre-application 
coordination, the Board would allow the applicant to impose 
emergency response plans upon the surrounding municipal 
governments as its whim. Exclusion of this requirement from the 
siting criteria would leave the municipalities at the mercy of 
the applicant in negotiating response plans after the facility is 
built and operating. Thus, while Tooele County would receive 
mitigation fees from USPCI neither Tooele City nor Grantsville 
City would receive any compensation for expenses incurred in 
local response to an emergency situation. This would result in 
the municipal tax base being burdened with extraordinary expenses 
and no way to recoup them from the applicant. 
Such a result was not the intent behind the specific 
siting criteria in question and should not be the policy of the 
Board in enforcing that criteria. 
Under any standard of review this Court should find 
prejudicial error in the Board's failure to require evidence of 
could be the closest location for emergency response 
personnel. Similarly, the lack of an adjacent 
municipality renders either of those cities as the most 
likely candidate for an emergency medical destination and 
the provider of other services necessitated by an 
emergency situation. 
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pre-application coordination with non-affiliated local emergency 
response personnel.7 
ARGUMENT III 
APPROPRIATE REMEDY: A JUDICIAL DETERMINATION THAT THE 
APPLICATION WAS NOT COMPLETE ON AUGUST 14, 1990 IS THE 
APPROPRIATE REMEDY UNDER THE FACTS OF THE PRESENT CASE. 
The Board and USPCI argue that if this Court finds that 
the application did not comply with the criteria found in R.315-
3-23 (c) (1), then it should remand the matter back to the Board to 
determine whether the application was complete on August 14, 
1990. 
Utah Admin. R.315-3-23(e) states: 
The plan approval application shall not be considered 
complete until the applicant demonstrates compliance with 
the criteria given herein. 
Following the adjudicative hearings the Board expressly 
concluded as a matter of law that the CIF Operation Plan 
application and the CIF Plan Approval complied with the siting 
criteria of R.315-3-23(c)(1), (2) and (3), and the application 
was complete on August 14, 1990 with respect to those 
requirements. (Index, Part B, Doc 61, Conclusions of Law % 8). 
1
 USPCI argues that the criteria in question does not 
require a written agreement or other writing. However, 
in his testimony before the Board, the executive 
secretary stated that the criteria in question requires 
written evidence of pre-application coordination in the 
form of some written agreement. (Index, Part B, Doc 55, 
March 17, 1992 Hearing Transcript at 441, lines 3-5) . 
s \dw3\6956 11 
If the criteria found in R.315-3-23(c)(1) were not met, 
the application could not be complete on August 14, 1990 and the 
Board's conclusion to the contrary would be erroneous. R.315-3-
23(c)(1) requires evidence that emergency response plans have 
been coordinated at the local and regional level before the 
application is filed. 
It is obvious that a requirement for pre-application 
coordination cannot be complied with after the application has 
been filed or after it has been determined to be complete. The 
Board and USPCI argue that the application process recognizes 
that materials and information will be supplemented throughout 
the process. However, something cannot be supplemented if it was 
not in existence in the first place. 
The complete lack of any evidence of coordination of 
emergency response plans with unaffiliated local emergency 
response personnel creates an insurmountable gap in the 
application that renders it incomplete. 
Based on the record before it, this Court can determine 
whether the application was or was not complete on August 14, 
1990. If this Court adopts the interpretation of R.315-3-
23(c)(1) advanced by the Board and USPCI the application was 
complete. If the Court adopts the interpretation advanced by the 
Sierra Club, the application was not complete as a matter of law 
and the matter should be remanded with appropriate instructions. 
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CONCLUSION 
The arguments advanced by both the Board and USPCI 
recognize that municipalities near the proposed hazardous waste 
facility site shall be involved in emergency response situations. 
Notwithstanding this recognition, the Board and USPCI ask this 
Court to endorse an interpretation of R.315-3-23(c)(1) which 
would eliminate the necessity of USPCI submitting evidence that 
emergency response plans had been coordinated with emergency 
response personnel at the municipal level. 
The Board and USPCI acknowledge that no such 
coordination took place, but ask this Court to uphold the 
erroneous agency action and USPCI's non-compliance with the 
applicable siting criteria by interpreting the specific 
requirement out of the regulation. 
The evidence before the Board and this Court 
establishes a complete lack of emergency response coordination 
between USPCI and any independent third parties at the local 
level. Without evidence of the required local coordination the 
application could not be complete and the Board's factual and 
legal conclusions to the contrary constitute reversible error. 
The Sierra Club respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the Board's error, declare the application incomplete and 
remand the matter to the Board with direction to re-open the 
application process. 
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DATED this 5th day of March, 1993. 
Daniel W. Jackson 
Attorney for Sierra Club, Utah 
Chapter, Petitioner 
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